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Abstract

technologies and the increasing prominence of the
“platform” as the new model of media which crosses
categories between different businesses like Facebook
and Google and media forms as different as radio and
video gaming. In tandem with studies on platform
economics and the meaning of platforms has come a
renewed interest in algorithms and software studies as
a way to approach modern digital content
infrastructures. This paper analyses the structure of
online media platforms in order to answer the
following questions:

This paper defines media platforms in terms of the
theory of traditional two-sided media markets, then
goes on to develop the theory to include content
providers as a third side of the market (the
“platformisation of media”), the widespread
introduction of sellable meta-information about the
platform network (the “mediatisation of platforms”),
and the importance of social networking technologies
to the media platform. Issues of concern raised by this
include privacy, intellectual property, and equity.
Genres of resistance to unwanted visibility and
invisibility, such as spoofing, spamming, fingering and
silencing are also noted.

•

1. Background
It is increasing difficult to distinguish any actual
analytical category that separates “retailers” such as
Amazon eBay and Apple from “search engines” like
Google or Bing or “social media” such as Facebook
and Twitter or even networked services such as Uber
or AirBnB. Nearly all of these companies include
features for searching content; for saving profiles; for
recommending, rating, and commenting on content; for
contributing content; for marking other profiles or
content as favoured; and for locating and grouping
audiences and targeting them with content. Obviously
the scale, scope, and emphasis of these features is in
each case is different, but it is not a stretch to argue
that they all represent instances of a similar
phenomenon. They are, by and large, distributors who
do not create content but who acquire and redistribute
it, and who sell access to and information about the
people who read, write, play, buy and connect using
their services, while at the same time attracting those
people by giving them tools to find their way in a sea
of content, products, and people.
Work has been done on the political economy of
new media [1] and on some genres within it [2-6].
Nevertheless, chief among the changes to the wider
Web in the last decade has been the rise of social

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41374
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-0-2
CC-BY-NC-ND

What can an economic view of platforms
contribute to our understanding of platform
media? And, conversely, how does an analysis of
platform media contribute to our general
understanding of other platform businesses?

It could be argued that instead of platform media
the term algorithmic media [7-9] might be used.
However, although an empirical focus on algorithms is
warranted, it is not (or not entirely) the presence of
digitized logic that gives these markets their character.
Platforms existed prior to digitized algorithms – good
examples are credit cards and newspapers. Yet,
algorithms make the functions of the platform much
more efficient and available. A secondary question
that this paper will seek to answer, therefore, is which
algorithms are central to platform media.
As platforms develop and algorithms increase in
both power and complexity, what is at stake is
meaningful public oversight over these developments
and their implications for society. Concerns about
privacy, content ownership, and cultural diversity are
often handled on a case-by-case basis, but the analysis
in this paper seems to show systemic features that need
to be carefully examined by academics and regulators.
First I outline what I mean by a media platform. I
then describe media platforms from both a technical
and an economic perspective, using the concept of a
multi-sided market in order to understand the relations
between different interest groups. I focus on the
centrality of social networking technologies as
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essential means of control of the platform and its
dimensions, and discuss the centrality of surveillance
and of algorithms of measurement, ranking, and sorting
for platform businesses. I illustrate these mechanisms
with examples from current media.

area in which exchanges are coordinated and in which
the presence of the platform gives additional benefits
the parties in the exchange [12]. A market with such a
platform is also called a two-sided or sometimes multisided market (or sometimes, multi-sided business or
multi-sided platform) [13].
In these type of markets, the platform creates value
by bringing disparate groups together (for example,
readers and advertisers) and allowing them to interact
in such a way that both parties are better off
(advertising messages reach readers, and readers better
understand the world and are entertained). Rochet and
Tirole (who won the Nobel prize in 2014 for his work
on understanding and regulating these markets) give
several media examples to illustrate their definition of
two-sided markets in their key 2003 paper: video
games (with consumers and software developers as the
two sides), streaming media (consumers and servers),
browsers (users and web servers), portals (“eyeballs”
(quotation marks in the original paper) and
advertisers), newspapers (readers and advertisers) and
TV networks (viewers and advertisers) [12].
According to Rochet and Tirole, the platform sets
the price structure and price level, and a key strategic
or competitive goal is to ensure that both sides of the
market sign up to the platform. In order to ensure this,
the platform may – and often does – structure prices so
that one side of the market operates at a loss while the
other side generates all the profit of the platform. To
take an example from modern newspapers, the profit of
a free newspaper (like Metro or The Evening Standard
in the UK) is what it charges its advertisers, less what
it costs to “pay” its readers in news and entertainment.
In a free newspaper the readers are entirely subsidized
by the advertisers, and one side subsidizing another
side is a common structure for two-sided markets.

2. Platform Economics and Media
Platforms
As literature on multi-sided and two-sided markets
has developed within the field of economics, often
using media businesses as examples, media scholars
have also been attempting to grapple with what the
“platformisation” of media might mean for issues of
content diversity, privacy, freedom of expression, and
the relation between free and paid labour. Mansell
argues strongly that new empirical evidence is needed
because “[t]he structural features of ‘platformised’
markets are continuously changing in ways that are not
captured in the assumptions in economists’ theoretical
models” [10].
The “platform” is an increasingly common type of
online organizational form. Online platforms include
search engines like Google, retailers like Amazon and
eBay, content providers like Wikipedia, and social
networks like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, as well as
some parts of more traditional software and hardware
manufacturers like Microsoft (Bing) and Apple (iTunes
and App Store). Online platforms are central to what
might be called the content or media infrastructure of
the Web – that is to say, the infrastructure through
which digital content and media, both privately and
industrially created, are distributed throughout the
Web. Companies based on the platform model, such as
Google and Facebook, rather than the giant contentcreating companies (such as TimeWarner or Disney),
have emerged as the distinctive new media industrial
form of the digital era.
The word platform is ambiguous and multimodal.
Gillespie [11] highlights the discursive aspects and
rhetorical functions of the platform, citing its
computational, architectural, figurative and political
meanings. Implicit in all these definitions is the
platform as a “raised level surface,” which is “designed
to facilitate some activity that will subsequently take
place,” [11]. The definition of platform, according to
Gillespie, implies a place in which all are equal, visible
and assisted in fulfilling their aims. As Gillespie
describes, platform-based companies use this definition
strategically to deflect criticism and to elide differences
between different constituencies.
One aspect not taken up by Gillespie is the
increasing use of the word platform within the
economics literature. As with the other meanings of
platform, within economics the platform is a central

Figure 1. Two-sided (traditional) media market
(newspaper example).
Why do advertisers subsidise readers? In fact, they
only do so in publications whose readership is includes
enough of the advertiser’s customers to make it worth
their while. In a multi-sided market, demand for the
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platform (and relatedly, the price it can charge) is, in
large part, determined by how many participants are
present on each side of the market. The more readers
of the right type, the more attractive the paper is to
advertisers. In economic language, when the benefit of
a network expands with its size, it is called a network
effect. When the benefits of the network size reach
non-participants in the network – so the size of the
readership benefits another group, the advertisers, it is
an indirect network effect.
In traditional media
markets, generally it is only the advertiser side that
increases demand due to indirect network effects [13].
Platforms exercise power in this example through
setting prices on both sides –in the example of Metro, a
price of zero to readers – which serves to attract and
retain enough customers on one side (the reader side)
for network effects to kick in and attract the other side
(the advertisers).
Multi-sided markets with platforms exist in many
businesses.
For example, the literature contains
references to credit and debit cards [12-14],
manufacturing [15], and services like real estate [12].
Yet, very many examples in the literature relate to
classic media markets such as newspapers and
television, newer media such as video games and
streaming media, and internet media such as search and
social media, and other types of computer software and
operating systems. In other words, media markets
have been seen as platforms or multi-sided businesses
since economists began to develop theories about these
markets.

to the platformisation of the media (see also Manovich,
who discusses this separation as a key property of
media software [16]).
The addition of content
providers as a third side of the market in turn implies
that indirect network effects in terms of strengthening
demand from consumers, and therefore advertisers,
will apply to platforms that supply a great amount or
variety of content (as suggested by the success of
content aggregators such as NetFlix, iTunes and
Google).

Figure 2. Three-sided new media market
(search engine example).
The separation of content from distribution is not a
new trend in media, (one can think, for example, of the
ever-increasing trend for freelance journalists within
the field of journalism), but the development of
computerized content management systems has
enabled this separation in such a way that it represents
a qualitative and not just a quantitative shift in media
business.

2.1 The Platformisation of Media Businesses
If traditional media types such as newspapers,
radio, and television are already included in the
definition of a multi-sided or platform market, what
then might it mean for media to be “platformised,” as
Mansell [10] suggests? There are (at least) three
dynamics at play in this platformisation process.
The first dynamic is the continuing separation of
media content from media distribution methods (in the
1990s this was referred to as convergence) so that
content provision becomes a third side of the market.
In our previous example from Rochet & Tirole’s
original descriptions, “newspapers” were the platform
and “readers” and “advertisers” were the sides of the
market. Today’s media markets are perhaps better
understood if we instead took the analogy that paper
was the platform and the news organization or
freelance writers contributed news content. It’s easy to
see this structure with Google, which has advertisers
and searchers looking for content provided by web site
developers, or with iTunes, where listeners find content
provided by record labels and individual artists. The
abstraction of content from delivery method is central

2.2 The Mediatisation of Platform Businesses
The second dynamic might perhaps be termed the
mediatisation of the platform. This is the development
of meta-information about the platform as a key part of
the platform business, for re-sale (for example, to
advertisers) as an add-on or additional product. In this
way, non-media platform companies begin to resemble
media. For existing media businesses, the collection of
information about their users, content providers, and,
to a lesser extent, advertisers, is extended in the
“mediatized” model.
An example of a platform business which is in the
process of mediatisation is Uber, a platform-based taxi
business with passengers and drivers as the two sides
of the market. It collects and analyses information
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about its network of passengers and drivers and their
behavior, and has begun to use this information in its
business, sometimes for PR purposes and sometimes
for revenue [17]. In the diagram below, the platform
graphic is changed to a cylinder form, which
conventionally denotes a database, to indicate the
presence of this meta-information.

development by Kane et al [20], but with more weight
given to content-related features since content is a key
side of any media market, and the relationship between
content and profile is deep and complex.
Although they are commonly used on the
“consumer” side of media markets, social technologies
may be incorporated, in addition, into the content
provider or developer sides of the market. It is also
possible to incorporate these tools into the advertiser
side as well, though this is much less common.
In social network-enabled platforms, a different
network effect, called a direct network effect, is
created: the number of users on the platform directly
benefits the user, since the more people are connected,
the more they can interact with their friends. This
direct network effect stimulates demand on the
consumer side in addition to the indirect network
effects on advertising and content demand. Thus,
social technologies can increase market share
(consumers would like to be on the network where
most of their friends are) or stabilize a side of the
market that might otherwise be vulnerable to
competitive pressures (consumers will tend not to leave
that network if their friends do not also leave). There
are some vulnerabilities, of course, for example the
generational effect that leads young people to seek
different media from their elders.

Figure 3. Multi-sided media market with
mediatised platform.
Once again, the focus on amassing information
about users is not a new trend within media (consider
the importance of Nielsen audience metrics within
television), or even within business in general, where
“relationship management” theories are built on
customer databases, but within modern platforms these
trends are made much more prominent and intense
using digital technologies.

2.2 Social Networking
Platform Media

Technologies

and

Evident in practice, but not much mentioned by in
the literature on platform economics is the frequent
introduction of social networking technologies to one
or more sides of the market. Social networking
technologies contribute to the development of the size
of the platform, the separation of content from
distribution, and the amassing of information all at the
same time.
By social networking technologies I mean
technologies which allow users firstly to create and
manage an identity and community, that is, to set up a
profile and to find, view, link to, and traverse other
profiles; and, secondly, to create and manage content:
to post and edit content, link to content, share content
with others, and rate or rank content. This definition
partly follows Ellison & boyd [18; 19] and its

Figure 4. Mediatised platform with a social
network enabled among users.
Social technologies serve other functions, as well,
for the mediatised platform business in creating the
meta-information about the platform, and in
strengthening demand from both users and advertisers.
On the profile side, they describe (and to some sense,
create) the network topologically through “friend”
links and structured profile information. On the
content side, they incorporate at least part of the third
side of the platformised media market (content
provision) by generating content themselves. On
Instagram, for example, users provide the photographic
content which other users browse; on Etsy, business
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owners provide discussions and tips for other business
owners. In addition, these technologies provide
information about quality of content on the platform
(through rating and ranking functions such as likes on
Facebook
or
ratings
on
TripAdvisor
or
recommendations on Amazon) and the structure of the
content (eg through playlists on YouTube or links
between patterns and yarns on the knitting network
Ravelry). The use of social technologies in media
platforms is compelling for many reasons, although
their implementation and configuration varies.

human intervention, institutions, and practices are key
to the continuing function of these algorithms [8; 27].
However, the algorithms provide a useful focus for
examining, evaluating and comparing media platform
businesses.
The delivery of media content to the user can be
handled by a browsing interface (for example, a
channel or electronic program guide), a searching
interface (the query box), or a simple display interface
(featured programming).
Most media platforms
provide all three types of delivery. Users of the
network generally experience these information reveals
as guidance or navigational help.
Algorithms for finding and displaying content
therefore include simple functions such as listing, but
usually the list is classified or sorted, and, most often,
ranked. We might think here of Google’s search
engine results, but another interesting example of this
is Snapchat, which has a time-limited display
mechanism. Increasingly content may be visualized
(this is, presented in a non-traditional format, such as a
map or chart or other information graphic), and it can
also be personalized; that is, the part of the network
that is revealed to you could be quite different than that
revealed to your neighbor (for example, your feed on
Facebook is different to anyone else’s).
As discussed above, mediatised platforms also,
importantly, store and process information about the
network itself, and these are the algorithms that
constitute the second part of the algorithmic
ecosystem.
Specifically they store and process
information about users, about content, and about the
relationships between users and content. (Rarely, if
ever, do they reveal to outsiders information about
advertisers or relations between advertisers and users
or advertisers and content.) This requires algorithms
that trace and track user behavior. Initially these
operated on page visits and clicks, traces of which
were built into the very first Web servers in the form of
http:// requests and referral records. But increasingly
high value information comes in the form of links of
different types, both user-to-user (eg “follow” links on
Twitter) and content-to-content (e.g., hyperlinks, the
first-exploited source of network information). Some
links come with information about the type of link. For
example, on Flickr you may identify “friends” but also
“family.” User-to-content relationships are established
not just by page visits and clicks on a mediatised
platform, but also by user-evaluation mechanisms such
as likes, tags, recommendations, ratings and rankings.
Similarities in these user-to-content relationships are
then often used to identify implicit user-to-user
relationships or content-to-content relationships as the
topology of the network is more and more described.

3. Platforms and algorithms
It is evident that the mediatised and social-networkenabled platform that is the modern media business
must have a considerable technical infrastructure. Not
only must physical datacenters store and transmit the
content and information produced by the different sides
of the market, but complex computer algorithms must
manage and process that data. The centrality of
algorithms to modern media businesses (and other
mediatised platform businesses, as in the earlier Uber
example), has been noted in the literature in the past
few years, prompting discussion of an “algorithmic
turn” in media studies, and potentially of “algorithmic
media” as the new paradigm [11; 21-24]. There have
been discussions of algorithmic cultures [25] and
algorithmic epistemologies.
Gillespie calls for an investigation of “public
relevance algorithms”. Napoli suggests, rightly, that
algorithms are probably best viewed as sociotechnical
assemblages with a distinctly institutional character.
This paper aims to contribute to the discussion, not by
suggesting how to investigate algorithms, but by
outlining which types of algorithms deserve the focus
of media scholars, based on the previous discussion of
the economic features of platform businesses.

4. Types of media platform algorithms
The core economic function of the platform is to
facilitate exchanges between the different sides of the
market, as we have seen. In the media market, the
central tripartite “exchange” has generally been the
delivery of content to the user and at the same time
user attention to the content provider and the advertiser
[26].
The algorithms related to this exchange are one part
of the algorithmic ecosystem of a media platform. In
this context, algorithmic ecosystem simply refers to a
complex and interdependent set of algorithms. This is
not to say that these algorithms are unchanging or
independent from human intervention. On the contrary,
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The meta-information collected by the mediatised
platform is then made available for searching and
display to the advertiser or other market participant.
These two classes of algorithms – search and
display, and tracking and tracing – are linked by a third
set which matches, groups, and sorts content and
people dynamically.

Making other network members or network content
more visible may also be desirable to some. One may
wish to indicate disagreement with the views or actions
of network members and fingering people or content
with tags (for example disagreeing their posts or
posting a private exchange to a public space.) One
may wish to have better access to content by
downloading it for use outside of the network.
Strategies for excluding or blocking unwanted
network members or content are also found. from
certain discussions, etc.
.

5. Platform media algorithms and politics
While the use of social networking technologies
and mediatised platforms makes economic sense in
many cases, the implications of these platforms are
troubling. At least three key areas of public concern
have been identified called into question with this new
economic structure. The first is privacy; the second is
intellectual property; and the third is equity or fairness
in representation. When viewed a certain way, each of
these issues of concern is about control of information
– how much should be shared, and with whom, and in
what way? These issues are central to the politics of
media platforms because access to information and
content on the network and about the network is the
heart of the platform media business.
Clearly algorithms do not exist in a social and
political void, and in fact struggles for the management
of the network away from its algorithmic base are
common. Without access directly to the algorithms of
revelation, network members turn to different tactics to
protect or promote themselves and others, materially
affecting, in some cases, the operation of the platform.
Not everyone wants themselves or their actions to
be made visible. Criminals, for example, do not want
to reveal their crimes; but neither do adulterers want to
show their relationships, nor employees their off-hours
hobbies. Companies and institutions don’t want their
internal discussions known. Dissenters may not wish
to showcase unpopular political views. The right to
privacy of both persons and corporate persons is
enshrined in the UN laws. Unwanted visibility may be
combatted by a variety of techniques (other than
simply refusing to use the media platform): cloaking,
or hiding your information; spoofing, or pretending to
be someone you are not.
Conversely, some would like to be more visible
than the algorithms of revelation show them. This
category could include aspiring celebrities; ideologues
who believe their views should be more widely spread;
or companies with something to sell; or content
providers in the margins who want to move into the
mainstream. Unwanted invisibility may be combatted
by spamming, or giving false information; or
boostering, paying other network members for their
links, recommendations, ratings, tags, comments and
similar.

6. Conclusions
In this paper I have laid out the economic
discussion about multi-sided platform markets, and
considered their implications for media platforms as
we know them today. I have argued that media is
becoming more “platformised” as more sides are
introduced to the market, notably in the form of the
abstraction of content production from content
distribution. And, I have argued that platforms of
different types have become more “mediatised” as they
increasingly store a layer of meta-information about
users and content for resale primarily to advertisers.
Finally, I have argued for the importance of social
networking technologies to the economic performance
of media platforms. Competitive logics within the
media platform sphere focus heavily on ensuring a
critical mass of users that will attract advertisers, which
in turn means either securing attractive (and ideally
exclusive content), either from traditional content
providers or alternative from content generated within
a social network. Secondly, the focus is on building up
information about that network of users (and content
providers, potentially) to sell on to others, primarily
advertisers.
The central algorithms of the platform media
ecosystem are firstly algorithms of search and display
and secondly algorithms of tracking and tracing. A
third, meta-class of algorithms of matching and sorting
links these first two classes. While these algorithms
may be opaque and complex as a group, each smaller
element of the class is potentially more available for
study by social scientists.
The platform business creates revenue by
controlling access to content stored within the platform
and information about the platform. Social issues of
privacy, intellectual property, and equity are all
directly and immediately implicated in the
algorithmically-made decisions about who can and
who cannot have access to the platform’s information
and media content. Users, advertisers, and content
providers all have adopted strategies to increase and
decrease their own and other’s visibility and
invisibility within platform frameworks, and these
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issues will continue to be at the centre of platform
media design, management, regulation and governance
in the future.
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